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Nearly 200 million hectares of topical forests were lost between 1980 and 1995, which 
led many conservationists to argue for a ban on all commercial logging and land 
conversion in tropical forest areas. Both logging companies and national governments 
were seen as sharing responsibility for the massive destruction of tropical rainforests, 
and various attempts were made to design new multilateral regimes, and new multipartite 
institutions for the global protection and sustainable management of key natural 
resources. In the 1990s, local partnerships were implemented to encourage private sector 
involvement in sustainable forest management and forest conservation. This paper 
describes a business partnership between a leading South American wood-processing 
group and a number of indigenous communities in one of the world’s ten biodiversity 
‘hotspots.’ It shows that the decentralisation of the development process, the recognition 
of local communities as legal entities in the management of natural resources, and the 
active involvement of profit-oriented firms in biodiversity conservation and poverty 
alleviation, all contribute to the emergence of new alliances between government, the 
forestry sector, conservation and human rights organisations, and local forest 
communities. This case study highlights the role that private companies are able to play 
in changing environmentally damaging business practices, in fostering social 
development, and in reforming government policies. It also points to the dangers of 
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The decade of the 1990s saw a worldwide mobilisation to save the remaining tropical 
forests from destruction. In 1992, the World Bank, which, to this point, had been one of 
the largest funders of forestry projects in the world, issued a new forestry policy that 
prohibited its financing of commercial logging or plantations in primary forests, even if 
the projects were environmentally sound (Lele et al 2000). This stringent policy was a 
response to fierce attacks by environmentalists and indigenous rights campaigners, who 
accused the Bank Group of promoting large-scale deforestation in the tropics, as well as 
the forced displacement of traditional and indigenous communities. The same year, at the 
Rio Earth Summit, the nascent international debate over the future of the world's tropical 
rain forests was fuelled with further arguments. Many participants in this debate, 
motivated as they were by a vision of the world's forests as global commons, called for 
the creation of a single, overarching global forest governance arrangement. They insisted 
that a global regulatory body was necessary to regulate the international trade in timber, 
combat illegal logging, and ensure the proper valuation (economic and non-economic) of 
all forest goods and services. But after years of campaigning and sustained negotiation 
efforts, nothing tangible has been achieved, and many environmentalists have become 
disillusioned. The ineffectiveness of the multilateral agreements signed, the weakness of 
the organisations set up, and the inefficiency of the policies put in place has led some to 
think that too much has been invested in attempts to forge an international environmental 
law framework (Gus Speth, 15 May 2002). To fight the trends which, identified twenty 
years ago, have continued unabated, the focus must now shift, it is further argued, to 
bottom up initiatives and local partnerships (Landell-Mills and Ford 1999). A number of 
researchers are also proposing that the time has come to turn to the private sector, and to 
encourage the good will of business enterprises, as expressed, for instance, in the 
voluntary initiatives of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD). Reflecting this new trend of thinking, the World Bank has entirely reviewed 
its 1992 position. Its new forest strategy allows once more for the funding of forestry 
projects in natural forests. Far from being a simple come-back, this measure is presented 
as the most efficient way to encourage private sector involvement in sustainable forest 
management and forest conservation (Lele 2002).  
  The privatisation of sustainable forestry and its further expansion in natural 
forests so far untouched by commercial exploitation remains highly controversial, 
especially in some NGO circles. However, a wide consensus exists amongst 
environmentalists and conservationists, who wholeheartedly embrace the reforms that 
promote the devolution of publicly owned forests to private owners, especially when 
these are ancestral communities whose customary rights have been recognised formally 
by states only recently (see, among others, White and Martin 2002, and Edmunds and 
Wollenberg 2003). They believe that open markets and appropriate financial incentives 
will ensure the sustainable use of forest resources, as well as increased welfare for poor 
forest dwellers. This explains why market-based instruments such as FSC (Forest 
Stewardship Council) certification are widely approved of (Bass et al 2001, Landell-Mills 
and Ford 1999, and Richards 2000), while company-community forestry partnerships are 
actively encouraged (Mayers and Vermeulen 2002, Scherr, White and Kainowitz 2002). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS117  Page 3 
 
  I describe here a specific business partnership between a leading South American 
wood-processing group and a number of indigenous communities in one of the world's 
ten biodiversity 'hotspots.' I show that the decentralisation of the development process, 
the recognition of local communities as legal entities in the management of natural 
resources, and the active involvement of profit-oriented firms in biodiversity 
conservation and poverty alleviation, all contribute to the emergence of new alliances 
between government, the forestry sector, conservation and human rights organisations, 
and local forest communities. This case study highlights the role that private companies 
are able to play in changing environmentally damaging business practices, in fostering 
social development, and in reforming government policies. It also points to the dangers of 
blind reliance on market mechanisms to promote sustainability. I conclude that only with 
the creation of a world organisation for the protection of the environment will it be 
possible to co-ordinate the global economy in the interests of ecological rationality and 
social justice.  
 
Government policies and the forest sector in Ecuador 
Government policies, be they taxation, sectoral, or macroeconomic policies have a 
critical impact, intended or not, on the forest sector (Panayotou and Ashton 1992). The 
development of industrial logging in Ecuador has been shaped by broad economic trends 
that are characteristic of many tropical developing countries, where natural forests are 
used as a source of land for agricultural and livestock development, and as a source of 
cheap raw materials (chiefly timber) for the development of local industries. Until the 
mid-1970s, when the oil boom launched the country into a decade of remarkable 
economic growth, Ecuador was one of the poorest countries in Latin America, largely 
dependent on agricultural exports, and with very little industry. The rapid accumulation 
of foreign debt brought about the promotion of industry by import substitution, massive 
public works programmes, and the mushrooming of the service sector and the 
government (De Janvry et al 1991: 13). In the early 1980s, oil exports started to fall, the 
oil boom ran out of steam, and the debt crisis hit Ecuador as it did in the rest of Latin 
America. Throughout the 1990s, Ecuador was forced to engage in a series of drastic 
policies and reforms to stabilise the economy and induce structural adjustments to cope 
with foreign exchange scarcity, and a distorted and non-competitive economy. By the end 
of the 1990s, the country's economy fell into a severe economic recession, It was caused 
by, among other factors, the continued fall of oil prices, and the massive infrastructural 
losses resulting from particularly severe El Niño weather conditions. Inflation had 
become the highest in the region, leading the government to replace the national currency 
(sucre) with the US dollar in an effort to stabilise the economy. Additional measures, 
such as IMF-inspired austerity measures and privatisation (especially the doubling of fuel 
prices, natural gas, and public transport fares) generated widespread popular unrest. 
Until the late 1960s, the Ecuadorian forest sector was relatively small and 
marginal, with a wood market essentially specialised in precious and semi-precious 
hardwood for furniture, sawn wood for construction, with the addition of firewood and 
charcoal in Andean urban areas. Wood was extracted from private lands (i.e. natural and 
planted hacienda forests), and from public forests located in the immediate vicinity of 
towns and cities. During this period, logging in the dense forests of northwest Ecuador QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS117  Page 4 
 
(the Ecuadorian Chocó) was similarly restricted to the banks of main rivers and around 
natural harbours, where loggers exclusively extracted precious hardwood species such as 
guayacán (Minquartia guianensis or Tabebuya guayacán) and chanul (Humiriastrum 
procerum). Industrial logging did not start in the province of Esmeraldas (presently the 
main timber producing region in Ecuador) before the 1970s, when large veneer and 
plywood producing firms were created (Salazar et al 1998). The rise of industrial logging 
coincided with the agrarian reform, the oil boom, and the construction boom.1 Industrial 
logging developed in synergy with the agricultural frontier opened up by the two national 
land reforms of 1963 and 1975,
2 which expanded the colonisation front into tropical 
forests on both sides of the Andes. Promoted by the Land Reform Institute (IERAC) and 
facilitated by the promulgation of the Unoccupied Lands and Colonisation Act (leyy de 
tierras baldías), the distribution of government-held forest land to colonists willing to 
pioneer small-scale farming and ranching resulted in the logging companies loosing their 
rights to forest concessions. Logging companies thus resorted to following 
opportunistically colonists as they grabbed public land along new roads. Colonists had to 
deforest their newly acquired properties as a means to qualify for government recognition 
of their occupancy rights. The settlers' primary interest in land conversion, and the 
logging companies' search for the cheapest roundwood, both encouraged by various 
government policies and incentives, led to the rapid deforestation of the cloud and rain 
forests open to colonisation. The colonisation frontier eventually stabilised, but the 
domestic wood market continued to expand. This sent logging companies deeper in state 
owned forests, where they reached indigenous and AfroAmerican settlements living 
traditionally along waterways. A unique deforestation dynamic was triggered. The wood 
industry, with its over-equipped plywood mills and sawmills,
3 required ever-increasing 
volumes of wood, while the communities, supplied with chainsaws and other 
manufactured goods, were encouraged to log liberally. With industrial logging 
progressing in the most remote corners of northwest Esmeraldas, an entire road system 
was gradually built by private companies, which self-financed the maintenance of roads 
built by the State (Sierra 2001:332).  
The Ecuadorian forestry sector feels disadvantaged by government policies that 
have prioritised the allocation of state land and credits to the development of agriculture 
and livestock. Some companies complain that the non-enforceable, de jure ownership of 
state forests and their use by the government as a security valve has led to a de facto open 
access policy for poor colons, which, combined with the adjudication of customary rights 
to indigenous people, has not been conducive to sustainable forest management. Other 
companies acknowledge government policies that have protected the nascent national 
wood industry, such as the banning of log exports; the banning of foreign operators on 
                          
1 According to Sierra (2001: 331), the Ecuadorian construction sector consumes 60 per cent of the 
sawnwood produced from natural forests in Ecuador, one-third of which come from Northwest Ecuador. 
 
2 For analyses of the Ecuadorian Agrarian Reform and its impact on colonisation and deforestation see, 
Redclift (1978), Preston (1980), Uquillas (1984), Rudel (1993), Southgate and Whitaker (1994), Sierra 
(1996), and Little (2001). 
 
3 According to Sierra (2001: 337), they currently work at 60 to 77 per cent of their capacity. He also 
mentions that veneer exports increased by 268 per cent between 1982 and 1993. 
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national territory; tax relief and subsidies for plantation owners; and industrialisation 
incentives that protected and subsidised Ecuadorian veneer and plywood mills as part of 
the state model for import substitution industries (Rival 2003). USAID economists have 
offered stringent criticism of these protectionist policies, which they condemn for giving 
rise to acute distortions in the timber market (Salazar et al 1998). Marcelo León, Head of 
the Marketing Unit for the CARE-SUBIR project, argues that these policies have led to a 
vicious circle of spiralling environmental degradation and economic exclusion for poor 
peasant communities. In the last fifteen years, the pattern of timber extraction in 
Northwest Esmeraldas has become increasingly exploitative of poor producers located at 
the beginning of the commodity chain (typically Chachi Indians), who massively exploit 
both their natural resources
4 and their labour force, while those located closer to the end 
of the chain (typically local middlemen and traders) realise substantial profits, with 
maximum profits
5 realised in the processing plants owned by white urban industrialists 
(Rival 2004).  
 
The company-community forestry partnerships 
I examine here the joint ventures between the Durini Group, which is currently seeking 
FSC certification for its logging operations, and various indigenous communities. This 
large forestry and wood-processing group operates locally by implementing community 
forestry projects, and nationally by participating in the elaboration of Ecuador's new 
forest law. It has also played a major role in the creation of COMAFORS (Corporación 
de Manejo Forestal Sustentable), which represents the industrial and commercial interests 
of the Ecuadorian forestry sector in national and international fora, and lobbies the 
national government on forestry issues. My analysis is based on ethnographic research in 
various Chachi villages of the River Cayapas basin, interviews with foresters, and an 
extensive review of project documents.
6  
 
The Durini group 
The Durini Group, Ecuador's oldest and largest timber industry comprises a complex and 
vertically integrated set of companies (logging, timber, veneer, plywood, furniture-
making, retailing companies, and more),
7 plus a private foundation with the status of a 
                          
4 Sierra (2001: 334) has found that excessive waste during felling and sawing amounts to up to 60 per cent 
of the original timber volume, an estimate corroborated by my own research. 
 
5 Several people I interviewed estimate that logging companies make a profit of over 200 per cent by 
purchasing standing trees from poor farmers and indigenous peoples. Léon and his team (SUBIR internal 
reports, 2001) have shown that one cubic metre of roundwood was sold for an average of 13 USD in 
Borbón (a regional supply centre providing 8% of Ecuador's lumber) in December 1999. In the same 
period, one cubic metre of plywood (whose manufacture requires two cubic metres of roundwood) was sold 
in the capital city, Quito, for 478 USD. 
 
6 This paper is based on a research project carried out between 2000 and 2003 and funded by the ESRC 
(ROOO238375). 
 
7 The firms involved are : ENDESA (Enchapes Decorativos S.A.); BOTROSA (Bosques tropicales S.A.); 
ACOSA (Aglomerados Cotopaxi S.A.); SETRAFOR (Servicios y Trabajos Forestales); EFOCOL QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS117  Page 6 
 
non-governmental organisation, the Fundación Forestal Juan Manuel Durini (FFJMD). In 
addition to sharing commercial interests, these companies are also linked through close 
family connections. Although an integral part of the holding, the private foundation in 
charge of silviculture, plantation development and sustainable forest management (SFM) 
has had to work hard to convince the other parts of the holding that its activities are 
essential to the group's overall economic growth and business prosperity. The firms 
comprising the Durini Group extract wood from natural forests (mostly from Esmeraldas) 
and plantation forests, and process it in various products for the domestic and 
international markets. The logging company SETRAFOR provides approximately 
100,000 m3 of wood every month to the plywood mills of ENDESA and BOTROSA. 
This wood is extracted from natural forests owned by indigenous communities and from 
lands privately owned by the Durini Group, when it is not purchased from intermediaries 
who buy it from small farmers, colonists, and indigenous or AfroEcuadorian forest 
dwellers. SETRAFOR does not make a profit, as the price it charges its sister companies 
is just enough to cover its operation costs, and break even.  
This leading wood-processing group took advantage of import-substitution 
policies in the 1970s, to boost the eco-efficiency of its industrial operations. Its capital 
investments in technological improvements resulted in a drastic reduction of wood waste 
during the processing phase. In the 1980s, it benefited from tax relief, low-interest loans 
and other government reforestation incentives, which aided the group to establish 2,300 
hectares of plantation. The Group was exempted from paying income tax on wood 
products from its plantations, and it benefited from low commodity prices and other 
government subsidies to industrialisation. The need to secure regular and cheap supplies 
of wood in a region where the most accessible timber had already been cut and the 
agricultural frontier stabilised became increasingly pressing in the 1990s. Anxious to 
secure its long-term wood supply, the Durini Group aims to rely exclusively on timber 
from its own plantations and from privately-owned natural forests managed sustainably. 
To this effect, it developed in the early 1990s an ambitious plan of plantations and 
reforestation, partly in response to ITTO (International Tropical Timber Organization) 
directives,
8 and partly to fulfil its long-term objective of relying exclusively on timber 
from its own plantations and from natural forests managed sustainably. It failed, 
however, to secure international funding to implement it, because of the international 
political hostility prevailing at the time against logging companies operating in tropical 
rain forest areas (Rival 2003). This failure, linked to conditions specific to the Ecuadorian 
Chocó, and more particularly, to the fact that the agrarian reform allocated forest lands to 
rural communities under a communal land tenure regime, means that the Group continues 
to depend heavily on timber from natural forests it does not control directly. This has led 
the Group to initiate a number of partnerships with indigenous communities. Although 
the Group would prefer, if given the choice, to acquire more private land and operate in 
forest concessions owned by the state, it finds the signing of long-term agreements with 
                                                                            
(equipment maintenance and repair); EDIMCA (Empresa Durini Industria de Madera C.A.). The firms 
MAPRESA and Peña Durini Cia. Ltda are closely related to the Group. 
 
8 Established in 1983 by the International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA), the International Tropical 
Timber Organization (ITTO) agreed in 1991 to the ambitious objective of prohibiting international trade in 
tropical wood or wood products not originating from sustainably managed forests by the year 2000. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS117  Page 7 
 
communities comprising a relatively small number of families and owning large 
extensions of primary forest to be a satisfactory solution.  
 
The CHACHI communities 
The Chachi Indians are a riverine population, traditionally combining fishing and 
shifting cultivation with hunting and gathering. In the past, they cultivated agricultural 
products (corn, plantain, and cotton) exclusively for domestic consumption, and traded 
forest products such as vegetal ivory (tagua) and handicrafts (canoes and basketry) once 
or twice a year. The Chachi cultivate fairly small plots along river banks, sometimes far 
from their main residence. Today, cash crops such as coffee and cacao are cultivated, but 
the remoteness of Chachi settlements makes commercialisation hazardous and 
unprofitable. A community cultivates on average four per cent of the total surface of its 
territory, the rest being kept as a forest reserve. Forest resources were not traditionally 
perceived as limited, and access to forest land was subject to little regulation or control. 
Land was not owned as such, but under the control of those who cultivated, or used it. 
This situation is completely transformed today, with the creation of permanent 
settlements with legal status around state schools, the titling of communal lands, and new 
positions of authority held by teachers and elected community presidents, who are 
usually closely linked to the Chachi federation (FECCHE, Federación Ecuatoriana de 
Centros Chachis en Esmeraldas). Social organisation was greatly transformed in the 
1970s with the creation of bilingual schools throughout Chachi land. People moved their 
houses to live a more sedentary life around school compounds, with significant 
environmental consequences. If many communities living along rivers and roads have 
exhausted their forest reserves, some are still in possession of valuable natural resources. 
For the past twenty years, selling timber has constituted a  major source of cash 
income for the majority of Chachi households, who log their forests at non-sustainable 
rates, and sell their timber at prices that do not cover their labour costs. They participate 
in both hardwood and softwood markets, the latter being linked to a few large industrial 
plywood manufacturers. The introduction of chainsaws in the later 1960s considerably 
changed labour arrangements. Chainsaws are rented, lent, given in exchange for timber, 
and this with a mix of cash, goods and services between wood producers and middle 
men. Typically, groups of Chachi men extract wood from forested land they own as a 
family or as a community, and sell it to an intermediary who has capital, a shop, a small 
sawmill, and/ or close connections with large timber companies. Women participate 
indirectly in this activity, by cooking for the men and by providing for the whole family 
while the men are away cutting or transporting wood. A quote from my 2001 fieldnotes 
illustrates the exploitative nature of the wood trade.  
The president of a remote up-river Chachi community was 
approached last month by a Black intermediary who wishes to 
buy a certain volume of sande (Brosinum utile). The community 
leader agreed to form a team of ten relatives to carry out the work. 
The verbal agreement stipulates that the Chachi team and the 
Black trader are to share the benefit a medias, that is, fifty per 
cent for the Chachi men (i.e. five per cent for each), and fifty per QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS117  Page 8 
 
cent for the middle man, each cubic metre being purchased at the 
price of $24. The going price in Borbón
9 is currently between $30 
and $40, depending on the quality of the wood. The team has cut 
100 pieces of roughly one cubic metre each, which were rafted 
half-way to Borbón last week. The whole operation took about a 
week. The sale should have earned each man $120, but they have 
returned from Borbón today with roughly $20 each. They have 
given me a detailed explanation of all the discounts charged by 
the middleman for damaged logs, repairs to the chainsaw, 
previous debts contracted by some of the men, and advances 
received in food, transport, and fuel for the chainsaws. 
 
Field research indicates that Chachi families essentially use timber sale revenues to (1) 
finance their children's college education (which is very expensive, as it involves living 
in the city for at least three years); (2) cover medical expenses (medicine and hospital); 
and (3) cover the cost of ritual and ceremonial activities. A large number of families are 
still producing for their own consumption, and subsist with less than $12 per month. 
Some families depend heavily on the material aid they receive through the state schools 
their children attend, and on government benefits directly paid to mothers. A few 
relatively wealthier Chachi have purchased agricultural land far away from their native 
territory, in Santo Domingo, where soils are fertile, and where Tsachila Indians benefit 
from a much higher standard of living. To my surprise, I also discovered through 
fieldwork that Chachi women without fixed employment weave baskets
10 not only for 
domestic consumption, but also for trade, and that the cash needs of the poorest families 
are almost entirely covered by the basket trade.  
It takes a woman between one and two days to weave a medium-size basket, 
which is sold at a price varying from $0,40 to $1.
11 Some old women with no child care 
responsibilities weave on average two baskets in one day. In one village, a woman sold 
twenty-four baskets to a Black trader for $12 (i.e. $0,50 each), knowing that the final sale 
to the consumer would amount to $6 for each basket. In another remote village, women 
were selling their medium-size baskets for $0,40 each. A woman I stayed with made ten 
baskets in one week, and another fifteen. She was released from all other domestic 
chores, and was working quite late at night using tree sap as fuel for lighting. These 
                          
9 The largest trading port in the region, where approximately eight per cent of Ecuador's total timber is 
transacted. 
 
10 Only a very small number of women living in the Cayapas basin work for wages, mainly as teachers. 
Chachi women weave a range of artefacts that figure prominently in the house: mats on which people sleep, 
baskets of various dimensions, with and without lids, in which the family's possessions are stored, and fans. 
These objects are made with the stem of the 'paja toquilla' palm (Carludovica palmata), which is used in 
other parts of Ecuador for making the famous Panama hats. They do other types of baskets with various 
other vegetal fibres. 
 
11 By way of comparison, day labourers (usually poor, older men) earn on average $2 a day to clean the 
banana plantations of wealthier village members. All the prices given correspond to the Spring and 
Summer of 2001. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS117  Page 9 
 
women were also selling cacao for $0,28 a pound. I noticed that older widowed women 
residing with their married sons sold baskets to buy soap and food, and contribute to the 
overall household's budget. In a village where a large quantity of timber was cut in 2000-
2001, and where fish and game are still abundant, it turned out that in terms of household 
provisioning, the income generated from selling baskets was actually greater than the 
income received from timber sales. Whereas baskets had provided a regular income 
throughout the year, which had been used for essentials such as food, soap, salt or 
candles, timber had been used to finance weddings and religious events, as well as to 
cover school costs. In a community meeting, men and women told me: "baskets make us 
live; we can get cash right away, we can make baskets all the time. With wood, we can 
get more cash, but it takes time to get the cash." Although I did not have the time to 
research the basket commodity chain fully, it was clear that a large number of women 
perceive basket production as a regular, secure source of income, to be contrasted with 
the market for wood, perceived as much more hazardous, irregular and seasonal. 
Moreover, women do not get into debts with their basket sales. It is an entirely individual 
activity, by which only what is already produced is sold. However, men tend to perceive 
timber sales as making the most significant contribution to the household income. 
Chachi people traditionally live in isolated house-groups dispersed along rivers. 
Residence tends to be virilocal, and each family group is formed around a father and his 
married sons, sometimes around a group of brothers. Siblings, particularly brothers, are 
ranked, the eldest son usually succeeding his father, and younger brothers leaving the 
paternal house. Marriages must be approved by politico-ritual leaders. A person who 
marries outside the tribe looses Chachi identity and all rights to land. Children of mixed 
marriages are sometimes re-incorporated when they marry a full-blood partner. Young 
couples marry after several years of communal life, and the birth of one or two children. 
Marriage is a sacred link, which cannot usually be dissolved by divorce. Monogamy is 
strictly enforced, and love affairs severely punished by ritual authorities, who 
ceremoniously beat the sinners. Houses are associated to one of the four ceremonial 
centres, or sacred villages (pueblos), to which inhabitants converge twice a year for 
celebrations marking Easter and Christmas. The dead are buried in the ceremonial centres 
where they married and celebrated ritual events. Deserted the rest of the time, these 
sacred sites are composed of clan houses, a ceremonial house containing a ‘punishment 
beam’ (cepo) and musical instruments, and a church with statues of the Christ, the Virgin 
Mary and various saints. Each ceremonial centre is associated with a traditional authority 
figure (gobernador, or uñi), who over-looks celebrations and enforces tribal rules. People 
say that these sacred villages are essential abodes for the saints, who do not like to be 
moved around like nomads. Whereas the living travel a great deal and live in many 
different places, the dead and the saints need to be settled. Ceremonial centres also act as 
exogamic markers. Men find wives in sections of the river (or in other rivers) that are 
associated with a ceremonial centre other than their own.  
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The joint ventures 
The Durini Group has initiated a sustainable forestry project based on various community 
forest management models. In the early 1990s, several twenty-year harvest agreements 
were signed with Chachi communities, by which the companies ENDESA and 
BOTROSA are granted the exclusive access to community forests for the sustainable 
harvesting of various soft wood species.
12 Each participating community is required to 
form a Forest Committee, which must have the support and approval of all community 
members. The private foundation (FFJMD) obtains the legalisation of communal forest 
land on behalf of each community, designs a management plan and a work plan, and 
executes various agroforestry activities with the villagers. The company SETRAFOR 
builds the necessary roads, brings its improved machinery, and executes the felling of 
trees according to low-impact logging and other sustainable forestry management 
techniques. Third parties, such as the Chachi federation, environmental NGOs, and 
technical assistance organisations monitor the agreements. 
Although novel by their formal and elaborate nature, these agreements are set in a 
wider cultural context, where norms and expectations as to what buyers and sellers may 
expect from each other have gradually evolved over the years. Black or indigenous, poor 
rural dwellers do not enter the wood market as free, knowledgeable and equal economic 
agents. Rather than fair prices for their wood products, they expect from buyers a whole 
range of services (food, medicine, fuel, lent equipment, cash advances, financial aid in 
time of hardship, and so forth) and community projects (roads, schools, teachers' wages, 
and so forth). The buyers they deal with are generally intermediaries, whose capital and 
purchase power vary greatly. Some middlemen operate with very limited funds, and do 
little more than offering a free ride or second-hand clothing. Others are directly sub-
contracted by large logging companies, which provide them with equipment and funds. It 
is in this context that SETRAFOR has operated a range of punctual and verbal buying 
agreements with small farmers, squatters, colonists or indigenous communities over the 
years, by which, in addition to agreeing a price, it may agree to build a school, pay for the 
teacher's salary for a set period of time, or pay for one or more children to be sent to 
college. 
Although not legally binding or enforceable, the harvest agreements signed by 
ENDESA and BOTROSA with Chachi communities are written, long-term, and much 
more costly than informal buying agreements. They involve the production of an 
elaborate forest management plan, a programme of reforestation, the development of 
agroforestry programmes, and various community projects for which new specialised 
staff is employed. They represent an effort on the part of the Durini Group to encourage 
sustainable forestry by aiding the socio-economic development of the families and 
communities who sell their timber to its companies. These harvest agreements represent 
more than a business deal, and involve more actors than buyers and sellers. A year after 
the various agreements were signed between the company and the communities, they 
were brought together under a single umbrella, the 'ENDESA/BOTROSA-Chachi 
Participatory Sustainable Forest Management Project.' The executive committee of this 
                          
12 The species harvested are sande (Brosinum utile), coco (Virola sp), jigua (Nectandra app), cuángare 
(Otoba sp), laguno (Vochysia cacrophylla) and calade (Nectandra sp). These harvest agreements do not  
cover hardwood species, which the communities are free to sell independently. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS117  Page 11 
 
project includes the Chachi federation (FECCHE), Fundación Natura (Ecuador's largest 
environmental NGO), and the German cooperation agency GTZ (Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit). The mandate of these third party actors is to (1) monitor 
the execution of the harvest agreements; (2) facilitate the communication between 
ENDESA, BOTROSA, FFJMD, SETRAFOR, and the Chachi communities; (3) help the 
communities strengthen their ability to negotiate with the companies; and (4) help the 
communities monitor the logging and forestry activities taking place on their land. 
FFJMD, the private foundation in charge of SFM, has developed detailed forest 
management plans for each of the Chachi communities with which a harvest agreement 
was signed. They comprise (1) an ethnological section on the Chachi; (2) a socio-
economic section on land tenure, land use, local needs and market conditions; (3) a 
physical geographic section describing the climate, geology, hydrology, and biology of 
each Chachi territory; (4) a forestry inventory; (5) a series of maps, including maps 
realised with the participation of the communities that define family plots, communal 
forests, and biological reserves; (6) a work plan that details the harvest cycle, the volumes 
to be extracted, the logging techniques to be used, the preventive measures to protect the 
rivers, and the evaluation of the non-wood forest products; (7) an environmental impact 
assessment; and (8) various additional documents and annexes. Many activities relating 
to the elaboration of the forest management plans were carried out with the communities, 
such as the forest inventory, the zonification of the community territory in communal and 
family-owned areas and in areas for agriculture, timber harvesting, reforestation, and the 
creation of protective forest reserves. A team of agricultural extentionists, foresters, 
anthropologists, health workers and social development specialists was formed to design 
and implement agroforestry schemes, and various education and health projects. FFJMD 
also acted on the Chachi communities' behalf to finalise the land legalisation process, and 
obtain official communal land titles for each of the partner communities. Finally, the 
Durini Group has taken the survival of traditional Chachi culture as an important 
dimension of its work, and it has sponsored a wide range of cultural activities, from the 
ethnographic documentation of Chachi lore, ethnobotany and shamanism, to the re-
introduction of traditional handicrafts and weaving techniques. 
ENDESA and BOTROSA pay between $3 and $7 per cubic metre of roundwood 
extracted under these harvest agreements, a price much lower than those found on the 
open market, which fluctuate between $20 and $35. The Durini Group defends its price 
policy on the grounds that (1) road building
13 is very costly, expecially in the first harvest 
cycle; (2) its companies bear the high cost of doing sustainable forestry, in particular the 
cost of reforestation; (3) Ecuadorian wood prices are twice those of Brazil, and the world 
market is very competitive; (4) prices vary because they are calculated according to 
extraction, road building and transport costs. As Chachi communities and their forests are 
most remote, the wood, costly to extract, is bought at the lowest price. After each harvest, 
funds are deposited in three different bank accounts, which correspond to three different 
funds: a) the forest management fund; b) the harvest fund; and c) the contingency fund. 
In 1996, social development activities represented 1.03 % of SETRAFOR's annual costs, 
and, depending on the community where it was bought, between 0.75 % and 0.81 % of 
the price paid for one cubic metre of roundwood. In the same year, the elaboration of 
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management plans and licence applications represented 3.74 %, and reforestation 
activities 0.30 % of SETRAFOR's annual costs.  
According to the company managers I interviewed, social investments result more 
costly than direct payments. However, they allow for the generation of public goods of 
greater value than the direct distribution of - relatively meagre - profits from timber sales. 
They also have the great advantage of lessening the risk of criticism by those concerned 
with the corrupting influence of money, or with the market integration of indigenous 
people. Villagers are well aware that companies are paying for the wood with services 
that the government should provide, and that this is the main reason why prices are low. 
However, they feel they have no other alternative to obtain highly needed roads, medical 
attention and support for education. SETRAFOR, which, as mentioned above, routinely 
pays the wages of primary school teachers and offers scholarships in the communities 
that control forest tracts it wishes to exploit, has extended the practice in the Chachi 
villages where more formal, legally-binding agreements have been signed, to include 
paying for the upgrading of school buildings, the training of teachers and other 
professional development activities, and college studentships (which have benefited 
primarily the children of teachers and leaders). SETRAFOR and FFJMD have even 
helped one community to obtain from the government the creation of a new technical 
college specialising in agroforestry. Moreover, teaming with various NGOs, SETRAFOR 
and FFJMD have also organised capacity-building workshops in partner Chachi 
communities to strengthen the level of socio-political organisation and develop awareness 
of the links between development and the environment. All this explains why the Chachi 
population on the whole prefers the company's pragmatic response to community 
demands, over the less targeted and more long-term approach to human development and 
capacity building adopted by conservation NGOs (Rival 2004). 
 
Social forestry, private sector participation and the cost of sustainable development 
This case study shows that it is feasible for firms in the forestry industry to secure their 
long-term supply and strengthen their position in the market by forming partnerships with 
indigenous communities. From the late nineteen eighties to the early nineteen nineties, 
the holding under discussion looked to mobilise the capital necessary to develop 
plantations in order to cover its growing need for industrial wood. However, the political 
climate surrounding the Rio Earth Summit pushed the Durini Group to find alternative 
financial strategies. As a result, the Group decided to involve selected groups of local 
producers through long-term harvest agreements, which offer a rational business response 
to ecological constraints, civil society pressures, evolving government policies, and new 
market opportunities. 
The Durini Group grew and consolidated its position under the state model for 
import substitution industry, which it used creatively to develop modern and 
technologically eco-efficient mills. Constrained by the depletion of easily accessible 
forests, and by policies that do not offer financial facilities for the development of 
plantations, the Group has designed an environmental management system that improves 
its logging operations, and makes it particularly responsive to the expanding export-
market for certified plywood. This new management system involves logging techniques QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS117  Page 13 
 
that are less damaging to the environment, but it also facilitates the expansion of logging 
operations in natural forests costly to exploit, and previously untouched by commercial 
forestry. The legal ownership of these remote forests, which used to be under state 
custody, has now been devolved to indigenous communities. Consequently, in addition to 
environmental concerns, corporate responsiveness has had to address social and 
indigenous rights concerns.  
This new environmental management system has given a central role to NGOs. 
For instance, FFJMD, the private foundation created by the Durini Group, has played a 
key role in the holding, for which it has designed and implemented silviculture, 
plantation development, and sustainable forestry programmes, including the harvest 
agreements discussed here. Although an integral part of the holding, the private 
foundation has had to work very hard to convince the companies that form it that its 
activities are essential to the holding's overall economic growth and business prosperity. 
Whereas environmental NGOs, particularly militant organisations close to Green Peace 
have refused to recognise the private foundation as an NGO (given its obvious links with 
the private sector which finances it), rival firms have remained highly suspicious of 
FFJMD's professed green and ethical business positions, viewing them as a new kind of 
competitiveness-enhancing branding. Throughout the 1990s, FFJMD has had to defend 
the rightness of its forestry model vis-à-vis a wide range of private, civil society and 
political actors, both nationally and internationally. In the end, the Durini Group has 
appeared as a visionary enterprise willing to reform and to promote environmental and 
social responsibility. In other words, it has gained reputation as a national leader, forward 
thinking, and capable of complying with the new standards set by global actors and large 
northern retailers. The Durini Group's leading role was strengthened by the fact that its 
company-business partnership model includes third party verification by the most 
established Ecuadorian environmental NGO. As this NGO was already implementing 
integrated conservation and development projects with the Chachi federation and various 
Chachi communities, it saw its partnership role (involving negotiation strengthening, 
monitoring and education) as entirely compatible with its other activities. Moreover, this 
NGO was keen to collaborate with a progressive company in the development of an 
innovative project which, if successful, would influence positively other Ecuadorian 
extractive industries, and, by way of consequence, promote forest conservation. To 
summarise, it is through the alliance between two 'NGOs,' one directly linked to the 
private sector, and one representing civil society, that the Durini Group gained trust 
nationally, and acceptance internationally. This NGO alliance, and community-company 
partnership it facilitates, became a landmark in the process of NGO evolution. It was one 
of the first instances in Ecuador, when confrontational forms of activism were 
abandoned, to be replaced by a will to co-operate with business, and provide technical 
assistance and services.
14  
The harvest agreements described in this article mark the successful adaptation of 
South American business enterprises to a new agenda of corporate environmental and 
                          
14 As Utting (2000a: 22-23) notes, developments associated with environmental and social responsibility 
are as much about politics as they are about competitiveness. And, as he further remarks, corporate elites 
are not simply reactive to pressure, or accommodating oppositional values; they want to lead change, and 
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social responsibility, driven by new financing policies, and the need to attract foreign 
direct investment (Richards 2000: 1002). Although the voluntary initiatives taken by the 
holding discussed here are largely an outcome of its production, technological and 
trading strategies, they have had a positive impact on Ecuadorian environmental policy. 
However, their social impact is much more difficult to measure, and less obvious. For the 
Durini Group, to manage forests sustainably in partnership with local owners and 
producers is a business imperative; economic performance must be the driving force. The 
tension between social responsibility and profit-making is clearly revealed in the 
asymmetry of the wood commodity chain, where, as discussed earlier, poor rural 
producers are particularly disadvantaged, and maximum profits are realised by white 
urban industrialists. The company-community partnership does not solve the unfairness 
of the wood trade, as prices paid to the Chachi communities are extremely low, mainly 
due to extraction and transport costs, as well as to the continuing under-valuation of both 
natural resource and primary producer. Although the companies discussed in this article 
have provided a range of social services to the communities from which they purchase 
wood, the delivery has been uneven and sporadic. Moreover, due to the low level of 
organisation, literacy and numeracy in Chachi villages, the companies have retained 
control over business decisions, as well as over the use of forest harvest funds. This 
clearly indicates that if voluntary initiatives may go a long way in enhancing economic 
and environmental performance, social equity, a fundamental component of sustainable 
development, requires a different type of intervention. As this research shows, Chachi 
villagers, who already rely on state benefits, are demanding free education and health, 
and cheaper transport. As the very low price paid for their wood under the harvest 
agreements is justified in terms of the high costs incurred by the logging company, 
especially the cost of building roads to access remote parts of Chachi territory, a case can 
be made for a different type of partnership, one which would involve an investment bank, 
the Ministry of Public Works, and the provincial government. This partnership would be 
responsible for developing a rational regional road system, which would correspond to 
the needs of the rural majority, and would relieve the timber sector from its heaviest 
financial burden, thus allowing for better prices to be paid to primary producers. 
Nearly 200 million hectares of topical forests were lost between 1980 and 1995, 
which led many conservationists to argue for a ban on all commercial logging and land 
conversion in tropical forest areas (Speth 2002). Both logging companies and national 
governments were seen as sharing responsibility for the massive destruction of tropical 
rainforests, and various attempts were made to design new national and multilateral 
regimes, and new multipartite institutions for the global protection and sustainable 
management of key natural resources. However, an international convention on the 
protection of forests is yet to be agreed, let alone to be implemented through efficient 
inter-state government structures with sanctioning power. In the mean time, as this case 
study has attempted to show, there is an urgent need to redefine the role of national 
governments in promoting sustainable development. Many state-led development 
programmes have had a detrimental effect on the environment, but this needs not be the 
case always. The state can be reformed and turned into an environmentally more benign 
actor, although such endeavour is particularly complex today, given the current pressure 
to restrict its role, and redefine the boundaries between the private and the public sectors.  
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